Over the past few years, commodity prices have experienced the biggest boom in half a century. In this paper we investigate whether it is possible by active asset management to take advantage of the unique risk-return characteristics of commodities, while avoiding their excessive volatility. We show that observing (and learning from) the actions of different groups of market participants enables an active asset manager to successfully 'time' the commodities market. We focus on the information contained in the 'Commitment of Traders (COT)' report, published by the CFTC. This report summarizes the size and direction of the positions taken by different types of traders in different markets. Our findings indicate that there is indeed significant informational content in this report, which can be exploited by an active portfolio manager. Our dynamically managed strategies exhibit superior out-of-sample performance, achieving Sharpe ratios in excess of 1.0 and annualized alphas relative to the S&P 500 of around 15%. * Basu is from the Faculty of Finance, Cass Business School, while Oomen and Stremme are from the Department of Finance, Warwick Business School, Coventry CV4 7AL, United Kingdom. Oomen is also a research affiliate
Introduction
Over the past few years, commodity prices have experienced the biggest boom in half a century. Oil prices have almost tripled from around $25 in 2002 to more than $70 by the end of 2005. Over the same period, copper prices have more than quadrupled. Unsurprisingly therefore, investment in commodities has been gathering momentum with particularly the fund management industry becoming increasingly attracted to this asset class. However, the sharp decline in prices in May and June 2006 has lead some analysts to forecast the end of the commodities boom. The purpose of this study is to show that, by actively managing a portfolio that includes commodities, it is possible to take advantage of the unique risk-return characteristics of commodities, while avoiding their excessive volatility and hence reducing the risk of substantial losses.
Much of the attraction of commodities appears to be the fact that they seem to produce equity-like returns while having low or even negative correlation with equities, thus potentially providing significant diversification benefits. A recent study by Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) supports this view, finding considerable evidence that the inclusion of commodities in a portfolio can improve its risk-return characteristics. The results of this and other similar studies were widely publicized, and received attention well beyond the academic community, which might be partly responsible for the renewed interest of the asset management industry in commodities. At the same time however, there have been calls for caution from academics and practitioners alike. For example, Erb and Harvey (2006) point out that simply adding commodities to an equity portfolio does not necessarily guarantee superior performance, thus emphasizing the need for active management. There is also the issue whether the publicity received by 'bullish' studies like that by Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) may itself affect investor behavior and thus alter the outlook for commodity investment. These concerns seem to be shared by a number of prominent members of the asset management industry. In this paper we investigate whether it is possible by active asset management to take advantage of the diversification benefits of commodities without falling victim of their very high volatility. More specifically, we ask whether observing (and learning from) the actions of different groups of market participants would enable an active asset manager to successfully 'time' the commodities market. To this end, we focus on the information contained in the 'Commitment of Traders (COT)' report, published by the CFTC. This report summarizes the size and direction of the positions taken by different types of traders in different markets (details are given in the next section). Our findings indicate that there is indeed significant informational content in this report, which can be exploited by an active portfolio manager.
However, our results also suggest that it is not sufficient to simply 'follow the lead' of a specific group of traders, but that it is instead the interaction between the behavior of the different groups that conveys the information necessary for successful market timing.
We construct long-only dynamically managed portfolio strategies and show that these would have allowed a portfolio manager to successfully time the commodity boom, and indeed exit the market before the 'crash' of commodity prices in 2006. Our analysis is conducted purely out-of-sample in the sense that the data we use to estimate the relationship between the COT information and asset returns does not overlap the period over which we assess the performance of our strategies. Our findings are similar in spirit to Erb and Harvey (2006) , who find that the use of certain market characteristics (such as the term structure of futures prices) in portfolio strategies involving commodities have historically been rewarded with above-average returns.
Our results imply that the CFTC data can be used to construct reliable signals that tell a portfolio manager when to switch from equities into commodities and vice-versa. In particular, even when we estimate our model only until early 2000, the resulting strategy successfully exits the equity market in mid-2000 (just before the collapse of the 'dot.com' bubble), and increases its exposure to commodities. Similarly, while our strategies 'ride' part of the com- 
ties, although present, did not constitute a significant part of their overall market position'
The daily LTR are not publicly available. Instead, the CFTC publishes a commitment of traders (COT) report every Friday afternoon at 3.30 p.m. Eastern time which details the preceding Tuesday's aggregate number of long and short positions of commercial and non-commercial traders, together with the residual long and short positions of the "nonreportable" firms, for markets in which 20 or more reportable firms are active. For noncommercial firms, the COT report also includes the number of long contracts that are offset by short contracts, known as "spreading" positions. Table 1 contains some summary statistics of the COT data for the assets we focus on below. As pointed out by Haigh, Hranaiova, and Overdahl (2005) , among others, this data is highly aggregated. Still, in this paper we show that it contains valuable information for the purpose of portfolio allocation decisions in general and the timing of commodity markets in particular. The variable we focus on here is hedging pressure, defined as the fraction of long positions within a particular classification.
For instance, if commercial hedging pressure is close to 1 then the majority of commercial traders are long futures contracts, which necessarily implies that the non-commercial and non-reportable traders on the other side of the trade are short 3 . We thus have three "hedging pressure" variables, i.e. for commercial traders, non-commercial traders, and non-reportable traders.
Data and Portfolio Construction
In this paper we consider a long-only portfolio manager who allocates funds between equities, commodities, and the risk-free asset. In particular, we focus on the S&P 500 index, plus copper and oil, and the 1-month CD rate as a conditionally risk-free asset. The predictive variables for the S&P 500 are commercial and non-reportable hedging pressure, which have been shown to work for timing the market (Basu, Oomen, and Stremme 2006) , and noncommercial hedging pressure for both copper and oil. Our strategies are executed at a weekly frequency with re-balancing taking place every Monday (following the Friday COT release).
Our managed portfolios are constructed as follows; using historical data, we first estimate a predictive model to capture the relation between our information variables and the returns on the base assets. Based on the estimated model parameters, we then construct dynamic portfolio strategies by specifying a mechanism that maps any given realization of the predictive instruments into a set of portfolio allocation weights. We then compute the returns on the resulting strategies throughout the out-of-sample period, and assess their performance using a variety of industry-standard measures. Specifically, we begin by estimating a predictive regression of the form,
where R t is the vector of risky asset returns, r f is the return on the (conditionally) risk-free asset (CD), and Z t−1 is the vector of (lagged) predictive instruments. While we assume the residuals ε t to be serially independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), we do allow crosssectional correlation (in other words, the residual variance-covariance matrix Σ of the ε t is assumed to be constant but not necessarily diagonal). To specify a dynamically managed trading strategy, we denote by θ
) the fraction of portfolio wealth invested in the k-th risky asset at time t − 1, given as a function of the vector Z t−1 of (lagged) instruments.
The return in period t on this strategy is given by, r t (θ) = r f + (R t − r f 1) θ t−1 , where
is the n-vector of asset allocation weights. One can show 4 that the weights θ t−1 of the efficient dynamic portfolio with given target mean m are given by,
where µ t−1 = µ 0 + BZ t−1 is the vector of conditional expected asset returns, H t−1 is the maximum conditional Sharpe ratio
5
, and w(m) is a constant that depends on the target mean m. In this paper, we use the constrained version of (2), for which the weights θ t−1 are required to be non-negative (i.e. no short selling), and their sum not to exceed 1 (i.e. no borrowing). From (2), it is clear that the conditional Sharpe ratio H t−1 plays a key role in the behavior of the optimal strategy. Moreover, it can be shown that the maximum (squared)
unconditional Sharpe ratio is given by λ 2 * = E(H 2 t−1 ), which implies that it is variability in the conditional Sharpe ratio which leads to increases in the unconditional Sharpe ratio. The goal of dynamic asset allocation in this setting is to find predictive instruments that lead to high levels of inter-temporal variation in the conditional Sharpe ratio.
See Ferson and Siegel (2001).
5 It is well known that
We perform two out-of-sample experiments. The first estimates the predictive regression until April 2000 and then uses the estimates as inputs to construct the dynamically managed strategy. The performance of this strategy is then assessed in the out-of-sample period from
May 2000 until May 2006. Over this period, the S&P 500 had a negative annualized return (-0.8%) while copper and oil had annualized returns of 34% and 24% respectively, with
Sharpe ratios of 1.31 and 0.52, indicating that oil was much more volatile than copper.
A long-only manager who intended to form a static (fixed-weight) portfolio of these assets, using historical estimates of means, volatilities and correlations of these assets but none of the predictive variables, would have only generated an average annual return of 1.4% with a volatility of 10.1%, leading to a negative Sharpe ratio of −0.14. In contrast, the optimal use of the predictive information contained in hedging pressure variables in a long-only strategy would have increased performance dramatically, with a return of 16.8% and a volatility of improves more dramatically, with the mean return increasing to 18.5% and the Sharpe ratio rising to 1.64. During this period, the strategy is almost entirely de-coupled from the equity index (with a beta of virtually zero), allowing it to achieve an active annual alpha of 15.8%.
The cumulative return and weights are shown in Figure 2 , and are very similar to those in Figure 1 . Our strategies thus seem to work well in both bull and bear markets.
We thus conclude that dynamic asset allocation using hedging pressure would have helped a long only portfolio manager time the commodity boom and would also have told him to exit before the market experienced a significant correction.
From our results, it seems that copper on its own would have out-performed our strategy in both periods. The question hence arises whether it would not have been optimal to simply invest all funds in copper. While it is true that with the benefit of hindsight, a copper-only strategy would have achieved similar performance, our dynamic strategy is forward-looking and does not rely on hindsight. Moreover, the performance of copper is specific to the chosen sample periods. Over other periods, we find that our strategy often out-performs individual commodities, sometimes by a wide margin, but virtually never under-performs.
How do the Strategies Work?
In order to further analyze how these strategies work we examine the correlations between 
Conclusion
We show that the information contained in the CFTC's 'Commitment of Traders' report could have helped a long-only portfolio manager to successfully time the commodity boom. 
